Supply chain ethics and transparency: An agent‐based model approach with Q‐learning agents

Daehyeon Park and Doojin Ryu

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 8, 3331-3337

Abstract: This study examines suppliers' decision making regarding supply chain ethics and transparency using an agent‐based model with Q‐learning agents. A supplier may not accurately identify the demand for its product because the impact of supply chain ethics on the market is opaque. Thus, we define each supplier as a Q‐learning agent that learns via an iterative game process. Our simulation results show that suppliers maintain low levels of ethics and transparency, which is a collusion behavior. Several suppliers deviate from collusion, but most of the suppliers collude to manage the supply chain unethically and opaquely.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3597

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:8:p:3331-3337

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().