Endogenous spillovers in a non‐tournament R&D duopoly under uncertainty

Yanfang Zhang, Yuchang Ji and Qianwen Tan

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2023, vol. 44, issue 1, 208-214

Abstract: Including R&D risk, this paper considers the choices of R&D spillovers in a simple non‐tournament cost‐reducing R&D duopoly game with Bertrand competition. It turns out that the two firms never disclose any of their R&D information when considering their R&D non‐cooperatively. However, if the firms decide their R&D cooperatively, we show, though they would always fully share their information when the risk of R&D is low, they would not disclose any of their R&D information when the market competition is fierce, the R&D risk is high and the R&D is efficient.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3675

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:1:p:208-214

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