Cross ownership and environmental corporate social responsibility with environmental cooperation

Sumi Cho and Sang‐Ho Lee

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 1, 446-468

Abstract: When the cross owners of firms commit environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) as a commitment device to soften competition, environmental cooperation with their managers increases ECSR commitment levels. While lower degree of cross ownership between the firms reduces more emissions by increasing environmental R&D (ER&D) and improves welfare, higher degree of cross ownership causes both owners and managers to decrease ECSR and ER&D, which distorts environment and welfare, and these results can be expanded under environmental cooperation. In a coordination game, coordination failures can increase welfare when degrees of cross ownership are high and product markets are more competitive.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4006

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:1:p:446-468

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