Innovation and mergers in generalized asymmetric oligopolies

Tomás Portela Neves de Almeida and Margarida Catalão‐Lopes

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 2, 758-769

Abstract: This paper addresses the impact of horizontal mergers on innovation, in an industry with a generic number of low‐cost and high‐cost competitors who first decide their level of process innovation and then compete in quantities in the product market. We derive the Nash equilibrium expressions for this game as a function of all the parameters involved, including number of players of each type, production costs, cost reductions achieved, and associated process innovation costs. Model results and parameter dependency are then illustrated in with a simulation of horizontal merger effects.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4027

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:2:p:758-769

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().