EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Shareholder activism on environmental issues: A study of proposals at large US corporations (2000–2003)

Robert Monks, Anthony Miller and Jacqueline Cook

Natural Resources Forum, 2004, vol. 28, issue 4, 317-330

Abstract: Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) has carved out a niche in the financial world, and each year a large number of shareholder proposals are filed at public companies in the US related to issues of corporate social responsibility (CSR). While the primary interests of CSR activists remain distinct from those of traditional corporate governance (CG) activists, the two groups do share an interest in minimizing the risk of negative environmental or social impacts from the operations of the corporation. They also share the objective of achieving transparency and accountability in corporate decision‐making. In relation to this latter objective, they both face similar challenges concerning conflicts of interest among key institutional shareholders. This article examines the record of shareholder proposal filing and voting from 2000–2003 for 81 large US public corporations to determine the relative prominence of CSR shareholder activism and the prospects for effective CSR shareholder activism on key environmental issues. The analysis of these data finds that nearly half (45%) of all shareholder resolutions are related to CSR, and that those resolutions which combine issues of CSR with traditional CG activism appeal to slightly more shareholders than issues of CSR alone. The article also examines shareholder activism at the micro level with a case study of the voting record at ExxonMobil. The article finds that CSR‐related shareholder activism represents the majority of shareholder activism within that firm and that resolutions targeted at climate change are particularly well supported. These resolutions draw a connection between environmental risk and risk to shareholder value. While numerous challenges remain for both CG and CSR activists, the article concludes that reforms that strengthen shareholder rights and corporate governance more generally will also benefit CSR activists and the environmental policies they promote in particular. The article ends with some proposed solutions for addressing the perceived conflicts of interest in corporate governance and the shareholder voting process.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-8947.2004.00104.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:natres:v:28:y:2004:i:4:p:317-330

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Natural Resources Forum from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wly:natres:v:28:y:2004:i:4:p:317-330