Bandits in the lab

Johannes Hoelzemann and Nicolas Klein

Quantitative Economics, 2021, vol. 12, issue 3, 1021-1051

Abstract: We experimentally implement a dynamic public‐good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free‐riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare‐optimal equilibrium, such as noncut‐off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.

Date: 2021
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https://doi.org/10.3982/QE1389

Related works:
Working Paper: Bandits in the Lab (2018)
Working Paper: Bandits in the Lab (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:quante:v:12:y:2021:i:3:p:1021-1051

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