A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games
Jeremy Fox and
Natalia Lazzati
Quantitative Economics, 2017, vol. 8, issue 3, 1021-1036
Abstract:
We study nonparametric identification of single‐agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle‐specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically equivalent when we restrict attention to the class of potential games and impose a specific equilibrium selection mechanism in the data generating process. We provide new identification results for the two related models.
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:quante:v:8:y:2017:i:3:p:1021-1036
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