Estimating matching games with transfers

Jeremy Fox

Quantitative Economics, 2018, vol. 9, issue 1, 1-38

Abstract: I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many‐to‐many matching, marriage, and matching with trading networks (trades). Computational issues are paramount. I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market. I apply the estimator to data on the car parts supplied by automotive suppliers to estimate the valuations from different portfolios of parts to suppliers and automotive assemblers.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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https://doi.org/10.3982/QE823

Related works:
Working Paper: Estimating Matching Games with Transfers (2016)
Working Paper: Estimating Matching Games with Transfers (2016)
Working Paper: Estimating Matching Games with Transfers (2008)
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