Twenty‐five years of corporate governance research … and counting

Diane K Denis

Review of Financial Economics, 2001, vol. 10, issue 3, 191-212

Abstract: In this paper, the field of corporate governance in the US from the perspective of financial economists is reviewed. It begins with a discussion of the fundamental agency problem from which that field emanates, which is the separation between the owners (the shareholders) and the controllers (the managers) of the modern public corporation. Relying primarily on survey papers, the current evidence on the various mechanisms that have been proposed as potential solutions to this agency problem is then reviewed. The contributions made by the other three papers that comprise this Special Issue on Corporate Governance are also highlighted. Finally, suggestions—my own and those of others—regarding the direction of future corporate governance research are offered.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:revfec:v:10:y:2001:i:3:p:191-212

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