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An analysis of advisor choice, fees, and effort in mergers and acquisitions

William C. Hunter and Julapa Jagtiani

Review of Financial Economics, 2003, vol. 12, issue 1, 65-81

Abstract: This paper investigates the choice of financial advisors in mergers and acquisitions, the fees that the targets and the acquiring firms pay to these advisors, and the speed with which advisors complete transactions. Our sample includes 5337 merger deals announced during the period January 1995 to June 2000, that involved publicly traded targets and acquirers. We find that top‐tier advisors are more likely to complete deals and to complete them in less time than lower tier advisors. However, the synergistic gains realized by the acquirers declined when top advisors were used. We also find that contingent fees play a significant role in expediting the deal completion. Surprisingly, we find that deals that are initiated by the advisors do not seem to take less time to complete. Our results suggest that the payment of larger advisory fees do not play an important role in determining the likelihood of completing the deal, but they are associated with greater acquisition gains realized by the acquirer. In addition, these synergistic gains are also associated with the switching by acquirers of their financial advisors within the same tier.

Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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https://doi.org/10.1016/S1058-3300(03)00007-7

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