Courts, firms and allocation of credit

Julia Shvets ()

Development and Comp Systems from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper investigates whether and how performance of regional commercial courts has affected external credit of Russian enterprises between 1995 and 2002. The results show that more reliable courts lead to higher bank lending to firms. This occurs predominantly through expansion of the number of businesses which have access to bank financing. There is limited evidence that trade credit also responds to changes in quality of courts. However, credit from suppliers is considerably less sensitive to court performance than bank credit. Court reliability is precisely defined and measured objectively using appeal rates of lower court decisions. The paper analytically derives the relationship between reliability of courts, appeal rates and lending to firms, identifying a specific channel through which law enforcement affects external financing. Empirical analysis is based on a new panel dataset which measures credit at the level of a firm and permits a number of robustness tests.

Keywords: law enforcement; finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G38 H40 K41 K42 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2005-09-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-fin, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-reg
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 27
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0509026

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