Herd Behavior in a Laboratory Financial Market

Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study herd behavior in a laboratory Þnancial market where a sequence of subjects trades an asset whose value is unknown. In two treatments the price is updated according to a deterministic rule based on the order ßow, and in another it is updated by experimental participants. Theory predicts that agents should never herd. Our experimental results are in line with this prediction. Nevertheless, we observe a phenomenon that cannot be accounted for by the theory. In some cases, subjects decide not to use their private information and choose not to trade. In other cases, they ignore their private information to trade against the market (contrarian behavior). (JEL C92, D8, G14)

JEL-codes: C92 D8 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2005-02-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-fin and nep-sea
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (142)

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Journal Article: Herd Behavior in a Laboratory Financial Market (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0502002

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