A Wide Range No-Regret Theorem
Ehud Lehrer (lehrer@post.tau.ac.il) and
Dinah Rosenberg
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In a sequential decision problem at any stage a decision maker, based on the history, takes a decision and receives a payoff which depends also on the realized state of nature. A strategy, f, is said to be as good as an alternative strategy g at a sequence of states, if in the long run f does, on average, at least as well as g does. It is shown that for any distribution, P, over the alternative strategies there is a strategy f which is, at any sequence of states, as good as P-almost any alternative g.
Keywords: No-regret; Approachability; large spaces (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
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Journal Article: A wide range no-regret theorem (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312004
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