Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes

Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh
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Nirvikar Singh: University of California, Santa Cruz

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A preference for negative reciprocity is an important part of the human emotional repertoire. We model its role in sustaining cooperative behavior but highlight an intrinsic free-rider problem: the fitness benefits of negative reciprocity are dispersed throughout the entire group, but the fitness costs are borne personally. Evolutionary forces tend to unravel people’s willingness to bear the personal cost of punishing culprits. In our model, the countervailing force that sustains negative reciprocity is a meme consisting of a group norm together with low-powered (and low-cost) group enforcement of the norm. The main result is that such memes coevolve with personal tastes and capacities so as to produce the optimal level of negative reciprocity.

Keywords: Altruism; reciprocity; negative reciprocity; coevolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2004-12-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-hpe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412003

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