Marketing as an entrance barrier into the fashion market

Pedro Vieira

Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper I intend to model a firm decision of entrance into a profitable fashion market where fashion results from the existence of positive interdependence between buyers utility functions. I conclude theoretically that i) when incumbent firm has an aggressive strategy it sets a marketing limit strategy that do not permit the other firm to enter the fashion market and that ii) when incumbent firm accommodates the other firm a la Cournot there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The properties of the model seem to be in accordance with the persistence in time of fashion brands.

Keywords: Fashion; Marketing; Utility interdependence; Entrance barrier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2005-01-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-cul
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/io/papers/0501/0501008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0501008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA (volker.schallehn@ub.uni-muenchen.de this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).