Collusion in the Dutch waste collection market

Elbert Dijkgraaf and Raymond Gradus ()

Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we analyse whether collusion exists in the Dutch waste collection market, which shows a high degree of concentration. Although scale effects might be in accordance with this market outcome, the question is whether this concentration is in fact a result of fair competition. Using data for (nearly) all Dutch municipalities we estimate whether collusion exists and what the impact is on tariffs for waste collection. The results indicate that high concentration increases prices and therefore (partly) offsets the advantage of contracting out. The presence of competing public firms might be essential to ensure more and fair competition.

Keywords: Waste collection; collusion; public-private firms; contracting out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L33 R51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2005-02-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-env and nep-geo
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0502006

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