NON-NEUTRALITY OF MONETARY POLICY IN POLICY GAMES

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Nicola Acocella ()

Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The main aim of this article is to investigate the sources of non- neutrality in policy games involving one or more trade unions. We use a simple set up in order to clearly expose the basic mechanisms that also work in more complex frameworks. We show that there are common roots in the nonneutrality results so far obtained in apparently different contexts as, e.g., an inflation-averse union playing against the government; a union sharing some other common objective with a policy maker; or when more than one union interacts with monopolistic competitors in the goods market and a policymaker. We finally show that there are other cases where the nonneutrality result can arise.

Keywords: neutrality; money; unions; policy game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E00 E52 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2005-04-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-mon
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 29
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games (2004)
Working Paper: Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games (2002)
Working Paper: Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504026

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