TINBERGEN AND THEIL MEET NASH: CONTROLLABILITY IN POLICY GAMES

Nicola Acocella () and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()

Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and Theil to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

Keywords: Policy games; policy ineffectiveness; static controllability; Nash equilibrium existence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2005-04-26, Revised 2005-09-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mac
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 9
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games (2006)
Working Paper: Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games (2005)
Working Paper: Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504036

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