Voter Turnout, Regulatory Commitment, and Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector

Dino Falaschetti

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Voter turnout is frequently cited as gauging a polity's health. The ease with which electoral members can produce political support, however, can retard an economy's productive capacity. For example, while mobile electorates might efficaciously monitor political agents, they may also lack credibility when committing to regulatory policies. Consequently, a "healthy" polity's economy may rest at an inferior discretionary equilibrium. I find evidence for this hypothesis by relating voter turnout to regulated telecommunications capital. Ceteris paribus, local exchange carriers employ relatively little capital in US states that house high turnout electorates. This evidence is remarkably difficult to dismiss as an artifact of endogeneity bias.

Keywords: Electoral Institutions; Voter Turnout; Distributive Policy; Regulatory Commitment; Economic Welfare; Telecommunications Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2003-11-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on WinXP; pages: 49
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0311002

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