Cooperation Breakdowns under Incomplete Property Rights

Jean-Pierre Tranchant
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Jean-Pierre Tranchant: CERDI-Université d'Auvergne

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In order to analyze conflict and cooperation between a State and a non ruling group in a general equilibrium, I unite pure rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict under an assumption of incomplete property rights. I show that a unique and globally stable Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Cooperation breakdowns appear to be twofold: generalized conflict driven by a collapse of the State and one- sided rebellion due to the coexistence between a strong State and a weak minority. Natural resources increase the conflict intensity but raise also the cost of rebellion for the ruler inducing this one to be more benevolent toward his minority.

Keywords: Incomplete Property Rights; Rent-Seeking; Redistribution; Civil Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D30 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2005-06-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 36
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0506006

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