A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation")

Yasuhito Tanaka

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Recently Eliaz(2004) has presented a unified framework to study (Arrovian) social welfare functions and non-binary social choice functions based on the concept of 'preference reversal'. He showed that social choice rules which satisfy the property of preference reversal and a variant of the Pareto principle are dictatorial. This result includes the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as its special cases. We present a concise proof of his theorem using elementary concepts of algebraic topology such as homomorphisms of homology groups of simplicial complexes induced by simplicial mappings.

JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2005-10-26, Revised 2005-10-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0510021

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