Agency in family policy: a survey

Alessandro Cigno

CHILD Working Papers from CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY

Abstract: Given that young children are under the control of their parents, if the government has a interest in either the welfare or the productivity of the former, it has no option but to act through the latter,. Parents are, in the ordynary sense....

Keywords: optimal taxation; optimal family allowances; hidden ability to raise children; hidden educational investments; endogenous and exogenous fertility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D82 H24 H31 J13 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Agency in Family Policy: A Survey (2011)
Working Paper: Agency in Family Policy: A Survey (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp16_09

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