Shareholders and employees: rent transfer and rent sharing in corporate takeovers

Azimjon Kuvandikov

No 57(3), The York Management School Working Papers from The York Management School, University of York

Abstract: The introduction of the ideology of maximising shareholder value and the rise of institutional investors in LMEs contributed to the development of an active MCC, which threatens managers with replacement if they do not act in the best interests of shareholders. However, some authors argue that restructuring for shareholder value through the MCC may negatively affect labour (Froud et al., 2000; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). It is suggested that such corporate governance practices may discourage employees from investing in firm-specific human capital and may pressurise managers into taking short-term profit-maximising actions instead of investing in long-term sustainable projects (Blair, 1995).

Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/11240/1/57Azimjon_working_paper_2010_3.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrc:ymswp1:57(3)

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The York Management School Working Papers from The York Management School, University of York Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by White Rose Research Online () and The York Management School ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).