Anticipation of Discrimination and Misperceptions in Cooperation Dilemmas

Devesh Rustagi and Matthias Schief
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Matthias Schief: OECD

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Does anticipation of discrimination (beliefs individuals hold about the behavior of others towards them) undermine cooperation? We develop a new design to isolate the role of anticipation from confounding motives. Using the trust game, we measure anticipation as the double difference between the amount transferred to outgroup vs. ingroup trustees when the trustor’s own identity is revealed vs. concealed. Using the context of affective polarization, we find that anticipation of discrimination undermines cooperation by the same magnitude as taste-based and statistical discrimination. However, anticipation of discrimination is misperceived. Our method can be used to study anticipation of discrimination across societal divisions. JEL Codes: C91 ; C93 ; J15 ; D72 ; Z13

Keywords: discrimination; anticipation; misperception; trust game; cooperation dilemma; affective polarization; United Kingdom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Anticipation of Discrimination and Misperceptions in Cooperation Dilemmas (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1535

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