Combinatorial and computational aspects of multiple weighted voting games

Haris Aziz, Mike Paterson and Dennis Leech
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Mike Paterson: Computer Science Department, University of Warwick

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision. A coalition of agents is winning if and only if the sum of weights of the coalition exceeds or equals a specified quota. We provide a mathematical and computational characterization of multiple weighted voting games which are an extension of weighted voting games1. We analyse the structure of multiple weighted voting games and some of their combinatorial properties especially with respect to dictatorship, veto power, dummy players and Banzhaf indices. Among other results we extend the concept of amplitude to multiple weighted voting games. An illustrative Mathematica program to compute voting power properties of multiple weighted voting games is also provided.

Keywords: multi-agent systems; multiple weighted; voting games; game theory; algorithms and; complexity; voting power. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 Pages
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:823

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