The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union: an Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis

Dennis Leech and Haris Aziz

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: The Double Majority rule in the Treaty is claimed to be simpler, more transparent and more democratic than the existing rule. We examine these questions against the democratic ideal that the votes of all citizens in whatever member country should be of equal value using voting power analysis considering possible future enlargements involving candidate countries and then to a number of hypothetical future enlargements. We find the Double Majority rule to fails to measure up to the democratic ideal in all cases. We find the Jagiellonian compromise to be very close to this ideal.

Keywords: European Union; Reform Treaty; Nice Treaty; Qualified Majority Voting; Power Indices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eec, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:824

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