Credibility and Strategic Learning in Networks

Kalyan Chatterjee and Bhaskar Dutta
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Kalyan Chatterjee: Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a model of diffusion in a fixed, finite connected network. There is an interested party that knows the quality of the product or idea being propagated and chooses an implant in the network to influence other agents to buy or adopt. Agents are either “innovators”, who adopt immediately, or rational. Rational consumers buy if buying rather than waiting maximizes expected utility. We consider the conditions on the network under which efficient diffusion of the good product with probability one is a perfect Bayes equilibrium. Centrality measures and the structure of the entire network are both important. We also discuss various inefficient equilibria.

Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: CREDIBILITY AND STRATEGIC LEARNING IN NETWORKS (2016)
Working Paper: Credibility and Strategic Learning in Networks (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:972

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