Targeted socialization and production

Facundo Albornoz, Antonio Cabrales and Esther Hauk

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: We study a model that integrates productive and socialization efforts with network choice and parental investments. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game. Individuals underinvest in productive and social effort. However, solving only the investment problem can exacerbate the misallocations due to network choice, to the point that in the presence of congestion e ects the intervention may generate an even lower social welfare than no intervention at all. We also study the interaction of parental investment with network choice. In many scenarios, intergenerational transmission of abilities leads to a tendency towards to conformism, which aggravates potential problems of network overpopulation. We relate our equilibrium results with the existing evidence on parental occupational transmission.

Keywords: peer effects; network formation; parental involvement; intergenerational mobility; cultural identity; immigrant sorting. JEL classification numbers: D85; I20; I28; J15; J24; J61; J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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