Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World
Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar,
Jorge Bruno,
Renaud Foucart and
Sonali SenGupta
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Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar: BLDT, University of Winchester
Jorge Bruno: BLDT, University of Winchester
Sonali SenGupta: Queens Management School, Queen’s University Belfast.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sonali Sen Gupta
CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA
Abstract:
We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.
Keywords: Public Goods; Groups; Position Uncertainty; Voluntary Contributions JEL codes: C72; D82; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-pub
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... _sonali_sengupta.pdf
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Working Paper: Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wcreta:77
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