Red Herrings: A Model of Attention-Hijacking by Politicians

Margot Belguise
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Margot Belguise: University of Warwick

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: Politicians often use red herrings to distract voters from scandals. When do such red herrings succeed? I develop a model in which an incumbent runs for re-election and potentially faces a scandal. Some incumbents enjoy telling “tales†(attention-grabbing stories) while others use tales to distract voters from the scandal. Multiple equilibria can arise: one with a norm of tale-telling in which red herrings succeed and another with a norm against tale-telling in which they fail. Increased media attention to tales has a nonmonotonic effect, facilitating red herrings at low attention levels, but serving a disciplinary function at high levels. JEL Codes: C72 ; D72 ; D83 ; D91 ; L82

Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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