Dynamic Electoral Competition with Voter Loss-Aversion and Imperfect Recall

Ben Lockwood, Minh Le and James Rockey
Additional contact information
Ben Lockwood: University of Warwick
Minh Le: University of Warwick

QAPEC Discussion Papers from Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre

Abstract: This paper explores the implications of voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall for the dynamics of electoral competition in a simple Downsian model of repeated elections. The interplay between the median voter’s reference point and political parties’ choice of platforms generates a dynamic process of (de)polarization, following an initial shift in party ideology. This is consistent with the gradual nature of long-term trends in polarization in the US Congress. JEL Classification: D72 ; D81

Keywords: electoral competition; repeated elections; loss-aversion; imperfect recall; advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... -_qapec_lockwood.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic electoral competition with voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall (2024)
Working Paper: Dynamic Electoral Competition with Voter Loss-Aversion and Imperfect Recall (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wqapec:12

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