Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism

Congjun Rao (), Yong Zhao (), Junjun Zheng (), Mark Goh () and Cheng Wang
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Congjun Rao: School of Science, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, P. R. China
Yong Zhao: Institute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, P. R. China
Junjun Zheng: School of Economic and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, P. R. China
Mark Goh: NUS Business School and The Logistics Institute Asia-Pacific, National University of Singapore, Singapore
Cheng Wang: School of Mathematics and Economics, Hubei University of Education, Wuhan 430205, P. R. China

Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), 2017, vol. 34, issue 06, 1-17

Abstract: Multiple equilibria (equilibrium excursion) affects the auction proceeds, and is bad for estimating auction efficiency. This paper examines the relationship between bidding behavior and equilibrium excursion. We analyze a uniform price auction mechanism based on a rationing strategy and common value information. In this uniform price auction mechanism, bidders (strategic and non-strategic) participate in an auction simultaneously, and the auctioneer rations the strategic bidders after observing their bids. The conclusions drawn suggest that a rationing strategy can effectively limit the strategic bidders from manipulating the auction, and the Nash equilibrium may not be unique (i.e., there exists an equilibrium excursion). As the number of bidders increases, or when the quantity that can be allocated to the non-strategic bidders is unconstrained, there exists asymptotically a unique equilibrium price which is the highest price the auctioneer could obtain. Based on these conclusions, we provide some strategies and suggestions on how to induce the equilibrium excursion state to a desired unique equilibrium state.

Keywords: Uniform price auction; rationing strategy; equilibrium excursion; pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium; mechanism optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0217595917500282

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