Impact of Information Sharing Modes on the Dual-Channel Closed Loop Supply Chains Under Different Power Structures

Tong-Yuan Wang, Zeng-Qiang Wang () and Peng He
Additional contact information
Tong-Yuan Wang: School of Business, Henan University, Kaifeng 475001, P. R. China2School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 611756, P. R. China
Zeng-Qiang Wang: School of Management, Xihua University, Chengdu 610039, P. R. China
Peng He: School of Management Science and Engineering, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, P. R. China5School of Economics and Management Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, P. R. China

Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), 2021, vol. 38, issue 02, 1-38

Abstract: In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models regarding dual-channel closed loop supply chain (CLSC) to identify whether the retailer has incentives to share private demand information with the manufacturer and/or the collector, and how different information sharing modes influence the chain members’ operational performances under different channel power structures. Given that the collector recycles used products, four information sharing modes (i.e., no information sharing, information sharing with the manufacturer, information sharing with the collector, and information sharing with both the manufacturer and the collector) are examined in the manufacturer Stackelberg and collector Stackelberg supply chains, respectively. We find that the retailer’s sharing information behavior always benefits for the collector and the entire supply chain. The retailer, however, has no incentive to share demand information voluntarily. As for the manufacturer, the retailer’s sharing information behavior always benefits him in the collector Stackelberg scenario, while may hurt him in the manufacturer Stackelberg scenario. Furthermore, the impact of channel power structure in the four information sharing modes is also discussed. The results show that the manufacturer Stackelberg model or the collector Stackelberg model may be the better structure for chain members depending on the retailer’s demand forecast accuracy.

Keywords: Information sharing; dual-channel closed loop supply chain; channel power structure; supply chain management; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0217595920500517
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:apjorx:v:38:y:2021:i:02:n:s0217595920500517

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0217595920500517

Access Statistics for this article

Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR) is currently edited by Gongyun Zhao

More articles in Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().