DYNAMIC COOPERATIVE GAMES

Jerzy A. Filar () and Leon A. Petrosjan ()
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Jerzy A. Filar: School of Mathematics, University of South Australia, The Levels SA 5095, Australia
Leon A. Petrosjan: Faculty of Applied Mathematics, St. Petersburg State University, Bibliotechnaya pl. 2, Petrodvorets, 198904, St. Petersburg, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2000, vol. 02, issue 01, 47-65

Abstract: We consider dynamic cooperative games in characteristic function form in the sense that the characteristic function evolves over time in accordance with a difference or differential equation that is influenced not only by the current ("instantaneous") characteristic function but also by the solution concept used to allocate the benefits of cooperation among the players. The latter solution concept can be any one of a number of now standard solution concepts of cooperative game theory but, for demonstration purposes, we focus on the core and the Shapley value.In the process, we introduce some new mechanisms by which players may regard the evolution of cooperative game over time and analyse them with respect to the goal of attaining time consistency either in discrete or in continuous time setting. In discrete time, we illustrate the phenomena that can arise when an allocation according to a given solution concept is used to adapt the values of coalitions at successive time points. In continuous time, we introduce the notion of an "instantaneous" game and its integration over time.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000044

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