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EVOLUTIONARY AND DYNAMIC STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH TWO INDEPENDENT DECISIONS

Ross Cressman, Andrea Gaunersdorfer and Jean-Francois Wen
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Ross Cressman: Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5, Canada
Andrea Gaunersdorfer: Department of Business Studies, University of Vienna, Brünner Straße 72, A-1210 Vienna, Austria

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2000, vol. 02, issue 01, 67-81

Abstract: A two-decision competition model is developed where players may choose different strategies at different decisions knowing that their payoff at one decision is not affected by their performance at the other. It is shown that both static solution concepts of Nash and evolutionarily stable equilibria for the two-decision model are directly related to those of the separate decisions. Furthermore, if there are at most two pure strategies at each decision, dynamic stability can also be characterised through a separate analysis of each decision. However, when there are more than two strategies, this last statement is not always true.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000081

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