A STACKELBERG GAME OF INNOVATION DIFFUSION: PRICING, ADVERTISING AND SUBSIDY STRATEGIES

Luigi de Cesare () and Andrea Di Liddo ()
Additional contact information
Luigi de Cesare: Facoltà di Economia, Università di Lecce, Via per Monteroni - Ecotekne, 73100 Lecce, Italy;

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2001, vol. 03, issue 04, 325-339

Abstract: We consider a firm that wishes to maximise the profits coming from the sale of a new product or technology by determining an optimal price and advertising strategy. A public authority wishes to accelerate and stimulate the adoption of the new product by using a budget to give price subsidies directly to the consumers. The problem is set up as a Stackelberg differential game.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198901000476
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:03:y:2001:i:04:n:s0219198901000476

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198901000476

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().