 REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN VIEW OF JEALOUS OR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR OF PLAYERSInternational Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 03, 281-299 Abstract: In this paper, several bargaining models, differing in some assumptions from each other, are analyzed. We consider a discrete case and a continuous case. In the former model, players bargain over a division ofnobjects. In the latter, parties divide one unit of infinitely divisible good. We start with an analysis of the one-round model, and then we consider a model in which players can continue to bargain. For each model, simultaneous moves as well as alternating offers of players are considered. The assumption that each player receives no more than his/her opponent proposes giving to him/her is the common assumption for all cases analyzed. Moreover, we adopt some assumptions concerning players' attitudes towards their opponents' payments, assuming that players can be either jealous or friendly. In view of the jealousy or friendliness of players, Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium are described. Keywords: Bargaining model; Nash equilibrium; exact potential game; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:03:n:s0219198902000707 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000707 Access Statistics for this article International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. |
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