The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation

Ted Bergstrom ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2003, vol. 05, issue 03, 211-228

Abstract: This paper explores the way in which assortative matching can maintain cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics. If encounters are random, then in Prisoner's Dilemma games, defectors necessarily get higher payoffs than cooperators and thus will eventually prevail. But if matching is assortative, the cost of cooperating may be repaid by higher probabilities of playing against a cooperating opponent. This paper shows that a simpleindex of assortativityallows a unifying treatment of the evolutionary dynamics in a wide variety of models of social encounters.

Keywords: Assortative matching; evolutionary games; cooperation; kin selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (103)

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Working Paper: The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation (2001)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001021

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