SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY

Marko Lindroos ()
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Marko Lindroos: Department of Economics and Management, P.O.Box 27, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2004, vol. 06, issue 01, 35-53

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the sharing of cooperative benefits between the potential fishing nations of Norwegian spring-spawning (or Atlanto-Scandian) herring (NSSH). I study a three-player coalitional game where Shapley value is used as a solution concept. The results show that full cooperation is a stable solution of the game, that is, no country finds it optimal to leave the grand coalition. However, it is further shown how full cooperation may become unstable under biological uncertainty. Therefore, I propose a simple mechanism to alleviate the problem. The instability created by biological uncertainty can be significantly reduced when simple modified cooperative strategies are applied. By introducing a safe minimum biological level for the fish stock (SMBL) below which no harvesting takes place and also changing gear selectivities, instability reduces a great deal. However, a safe minimum economic level (SMEL) when there may be perfect stability is shown to be higher than the SMBL.

Keywords: Norwegian spring-spawning herring; coalitions; benefit sharing; fisheries; biological uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1142/S021919890400006X

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