MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS

Harald Wiese ()
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Harald Wiese: Universität Leipzig, Postfach 920, 04009 Leipzig, Germany

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 02, 307-322

Abstract: The paper presents a coalition-structure value that is meant to capture outside options of players in a cooperative game. It deviates from the Aumann-Drèze value by violating the null-player axiom. We use this value as a power index and apply it to weighted majority games.

Keywords: Power; government coalition; outside option; Aumann-Drèze value; Shapley value; null-player axiom; JEL Classification: C71; JEL Classification: H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001412

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