COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH

Pedro Pintassilgo () and Marko Lindroos ()
Additional contact information
Pedro Pintassilgo: Faculty of Economics, University of Algarve, Campus de Gambelas, 8005-139, Faro, Portugal
Marko Lindroos: Department of Economics and Management, P. O. Box 27, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2008, vol. 10, issue 03, 303-317

Abstract: In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assumingex antesymmetric players and the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the game is characterized by positive externalities — the merger of coalitions increases the payoffs of players who belong to other coalitions. A key result is that, apart from the case of two players, the grand coalition is not a Nash equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, in the case of three or more players the only Nash equilibrium coalition structure is the one formed by singletons. The results indicate that the prospects of cooperation in straddling stock fisheries are low if players can free ride cooperative agreements. Thus, in order to protect cooperation, under the aegis of regional fishery management organizations, unregulated fishing must be prevented.

Keywords: Coalition; partition function; externalities; bioeconomic model; straddling fish stock; C72; Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198908001959
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:n:s0219198908001959

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198908001959

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().