A GENERIC APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION

Krzysztof R. Apt () and Andreas Witzel ()
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Krzysztof R. Apt: CWI, Science Park 123, 1098 XG Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Andreas Witzel: ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Plantage Muidergracht 24, 1018 TV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 03, 347-367

Abstract: We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.

Keywords: Coalition formation; stable partition; merges and splits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002352

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