THE AUMANN-DRÈZE VALUE, THE WIESE VALUE, AND STABILITY: A NOTE

Andreas Tutic ()
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Andreas Tutic: Universität Leipzig, Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik & Institut für Soziologie, Germany

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 02, 189-195

Abstract: In this note we present an example of a TU game where both the value presented by Aumann and Drèze (1974) and the value introduced by Wiese (2007) do not exhibit a stable coalition structure.

Keywords: TU games; stability; Wiese value; AD value; χ-value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002593

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