FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS

Vladimir V. Mazalov () and Anna N. Rettieva ()
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Vladimir V. Mazalov: Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of Russian Academy of Science, Pushkinskaya str. 11, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia
Anna N. Rettieva: Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of Russian Academy of Science, Pushkinskaya str. 11, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 04, 385-405

Abstract: Discrete-time game-theoretic models related to a bioresource management problem (fish catching) are investigated. There are some players (countries or fishing firms) which harvest the fish stock. Power population's growth function and logarithmic players' profits are considered.We derive the Nash and cooperative equilibria. We construct the characteristic function for cooperative game in two unusual forms and determine the Shapley value and time-consistent imputation distribution procedure [Petrosjan (1977)].We propose the condition which gives an incentive for the players to keep cooperation at each stage and compare it with the "irrational-behavior-profness" condition [Yeung (2006)].We propose the linear programming method to find the time-consistent "rational" solution inC-core. The numerical modelling and the results' comparison were carried out.

Keywords: Dynamic games; bioresource management problem; time-consistency; rational behavior condition; 91A50; 91A80; 49N70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002738

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