THE NUCLEOLUS OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM BY HYDRAULIC RATIONING

Tamás Fleiner () and Balázs Sziklai
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Tamás Fleiner: Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Department of Computer Science and Information Theory, H-1117 Budapest, Magyar tudósok körútja 2, Hungary

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2012, vol. 14, issue 01, 1-11

Abstract: In this note, we give a straightforward and elementary proof of a theorem by Aumann and Maschler stating that in the well-known bankruptcy problem, the so-called CG-consistent solution described by the Talmud represents the nucleolus of the corresponding coalitional game. The proof nicely fits into the hydraulic rationing framework proposed by Kaminski. We point out further interesting properties in connection with this framework.

Keywords: Bankruptcy problem; Talmud rule; nucleolus; hydraulic rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198912500077

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