COMPARING POWER INDICES
Cesarino Bertini (),
Josep Freixas (),
Gianfranco Gambarelli () and
Izabella Stach ()
Additional contact information
Cesarino Bertini: Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Bergamo, via dei Caniana 2, 24127 Bergamo, Italy
Josep Freixas: Department of Applied Mathematics III and High Engineering School, (Manresa Campus), Technical University of Catalonia, Av. de les Bases de Manresa, 71-73 Manresa, Spain
Gianfranco Gambarelli: Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Bergamo, via dei Caniana 2, 24127 Bergamo, Italy
Izabella Stach: AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, ul. Gramatyka 10, 30-067 Krakow, Poland
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 02, 1-19
Abstract:
This paper aims to give a global vision concerning the state of the art of studies on 13 power indices and to establish which of them are more suitable for describing the real situations which are, from time to time, taken into consideration. In such contexts, different comparisons have been developed in terms of properties, axiomatic grounds and so on. This analysis points out various open problems.
Keywords: Cooperative games; power indices; simple games; voting; 91A06; 91A12; 91B12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198913400045
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:02:n:s0219198913400045
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400045
Access Statistics for this article
International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung
More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().