THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY
Sylvain Béal,
Amandine Ghintran,
Eric Rémila and
Philippe Solal
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 03, 1-19
Abstract:
The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor.107, 453–462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of riparian agents. Solutions to that problem are reviewed in this article. These solutions are obtained via an axiomatic study on the class of river TU-games or via a market mechanism.
Keywords: Core; externalities; graph games; marginal vectors; river sharing problem; C71; D62; H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
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Working Paper: The River Sharing Problem: a Survey (2013)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400161
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