POWER INDICES AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES
Yves Crama (yves.crama@ulg.ac.be) and
Luc Leruth (lleruth@imf.org)
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Yves Crama: QuantOM, HEC Management School, University of Liège, 4000 Liège, Belgium
Luc Leruth: IMF, Central AFRITAC, Washington DC 20431, USA
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 03, 1-15
Abstract:
This paper proposes a brief review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance literature. Without losing sight of the field of application, it places the emphasis on the game-theoretic aspects of this research and on the issues that arise in this framework. It should be noted that the views presented in this paper are not necessarily those of the IMF.
Keywords: Simple games; voting; power index; corporate governance; ownership structure; C71 Cooperative Games; G3 Corporate Finance and Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400173
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