AVERAGE RULES FOR COOPERATIVE TU GAMES

A. Sugumaran (), V. Thangaraj () and G. Ravindran ()
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A. Sugumaran: Department of Mathematics, Government Arts College, Thiruvalluvar University, Tiruvannamalai, 606 603, India
V. Thangaraj: School of Mathematics, Vel Tech University, Avadi, Chennai - 600 062, India
G. Ravindran: Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai Centre, MGR Knowledge City, CIT Campus, Taramani, Chennai, 600 113, India

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 04, 1-14

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a new single valued rule based on the concept of fair division for all cooperative transferable utility (TU) games. In any cooperative TU game, primarily the coalitions that are likely to form are identified and each such coalition is fixed with a payoff vector based on the notion of fairness. The value of the single valued rule is obtained from the collection of all coalition structures consisting of the coalitions that are likely to form. The uniqueness of the new rule is followed by its existence and computational simplicity for all TU games. Finally, a linear average rule is defined, and some of its properties are discussed.

Keywords: Strongly dominating coalition; coalition structure; normalized weighted average value; 91A05; 91A06; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400276

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