A Nonlinear Programming Approach to Determine a Generalized Equilibrium for N-Person Normal Form Games
Ahmad Nahhas and
H. W. Corley ()
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Ahmad Nahhas: Department of Industrial, Manufacturing, and Systems Engineering, The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX 76019, USA
H. W. Corley: Center on Stochastic Modeling, Optimization, and Statistics, The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX 76019, USA
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2017, vol. 19, issue 03, 1-15
Abstract:
A generalized equilibrium (GE) for finite n-person normal form games is defined as a collection of mixed strategies with the following property: no player in some subset B of the players can achieve a better expected payoff if players in an associated set G change strategies unilaterally. A GE is proved to exist for a game if and only if the maximum objective function value of a certain nonlinear programming problem is zero, in which case the solution to the nonlinear program yields a GE.
Keywords: Generalized equilibrium; mixed Berge equilibrium; Berge equilibrium; nonlinear programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198917500116
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